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I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11), nations around the
world began adopting emergency measures that emphasized national
security but infringed on the rights guaranteed to citizens through their
respective domestic constitutions and international law.' Pakistan and the
United States were amongst the most active of those nations, as tenuous
partners in the War on Terror.2 Since then, both countries have adopted
methods that have not only violated the rights of their citizens, but have
disrupted the delicate balance of power between their three branches of
government. There are glaring lessons to be learned from the experience of
both sides, evident in the manner Pakistan has dealt with homegrown and
foreign terrorism for decades 3 and the United States' well-established
judicial institutions that preserve civil liberties, that have been largely
suspended during the War on Terror.
Both nations must develop methods for investigating and punishing
terrorists that accord with the traditional national and international laws
concerning admissibility of evidence, judicial review over determinations
of the executive branch, fair trial, and privacy. The importance of these
1 See David Schultz, Democracy on Trial: Terrorism, Crime and National Security in a
Post 9-11 World, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv., 195 (2008).
2. See generally HUSAIN HAQQANI, MAGNIFICENT DELUSIONS: PAKISTAN, THE UNITED
STATES, AND AN EPIC HISTORY OF MISUNDERSTANDING (2013); see also DANIEL S. MARKEY, No EXIT
FROM PAKISTAN: AMERICA'S TORTURED RELATIONSHIP WITH ISLAMABAD (2013).
3. Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan in the Grip of Chaos, BBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2014), available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25870662 (last visited Sep 27, 2014).
Pakistani Taliban attacks on military personnel and civilians now include mass
bombings of mosques, churches and bazaars. And in recent months the Taliban
have become adept at targeted killings of politicians, bureaucrats and senior
officials in the army and police, too, using suicide bombers, gunmen on
motorbikes or mines laid in the road.
4. Kendall W. Harrison, The Evolving Judicial Response to the War on Terrorism, 75-DEC
Wis. LAW. 14, (2002).
September 11, 2001, changed the face of America. The horrific events of that
tragic day have challenged the country's sense of security, its trust of those unlike
us, and its faith in the future. But the long shadows of Sept. 11 stretch beyond
any individual's sense of personal well-being. They have placed America's
constitutional legacy under great strain as well.
5. Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: FACT SHEET 32, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (July 7, 2008), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet 32].
Respect for human rights and the rule of law must be the bedrock of the global
fight against terrorism. This requires the development of national counter-
terrorism strategies that seek to prevent acts of terrorism, prosecute those
responsible for such criminal acts, and promote and protect human rights and the
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principles has been lost in the post-9/11 era, which is why this study will
assert the need for governments to respect civil rights in their pursuit of
security by using the criminal law enforcement model to deal with modem
terrorism.
Specifically, this article will look to the various issues surrounding
surveillance by critically examining and comparing Pakistan's Investigation
For Fair Trial Act of 20136 and the United States' PATRIOT Act7 and
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). While FISA gave the U.S.
judiciary its powers to grant warrants for wiretaps conducted by intelligence
agencies,9 the PATRIOT Act altered wiretapping requirements and
essentially limited the court's ability to supervise surveillance conducted by
government entities.'0 Pakistan's Fair Trial Act is modeled after these laws
and has been subject to the same criticisms; namely that these expansive
surveillance laws disregard the right of citizens through encroachment,
allowing the judiciary to be involved in the surveillance process." This
note will examine the history of wiretapping in the United States and
Pakistan, and critically evaluate its recent changes to accommodate for the
War on Terror.
rule of law. It implies measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread
of terrorism, including the lack of rule of law and violations of human rights,
ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, and socio-
economic marginalization; to foster the active participation and leadership of civil
society; to condemn human rights violations, prohibit them in national law,
promptly investigate and prosecute them, and prevent them ....
6. See generally The Investigation for Fair Trial Act, No. I of 2013, THE GAZETTE OF
PAKISTAN EXTRAORDINARY, Feb. 22, 2013 [hereinafter Fair Trial Act].
7. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter
USA PATRIOT Act].
8. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2014).
9. Nicholas J. Whilt, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Protecting the Civil
Liberties That Make Defense of Our Nation Worthwhile, 35 Sw. U. L. REv. 361, 363 (2006) (FISA was
supposed to create "a sound balance between the need for such surveillance and the protection of civil
liberties"); see also S. Rep. No. 95-604, at 9 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3910
[hereinafter S. Rep. No. 95-604].
10. Rebecca A. Copeland, War on Terrorism or War on Constitutional Rights? Blurring the
Lines of Intelligence Gathering in Post-September 11 America, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 3 (2004)
("Passage of the USA PATRIOT Act has amplified long-standing challenges by scholars to the
constitutionality of the FISA.").
11. See Saba Imtiaz, Pakistan's Patriot Act?: How Fair is the New Trial Bill?, THE EXPRESS
TRIBUNE, (Oct. 22, 2012), at 2, available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/454973/pakistans-patriot-act-
how-fair-is-the-new-trial-bill/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
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II. AGE OF TERRORISM: WAR, CRIME, AND EMERGENCY RULES
A. Large Crime, Not Small War
For countries that have had a long history of dealing with terrorist
groups, there are two traditional modes by which they deal with terrorism,
"[a]s pre-9/11 books on terrorism customarily noted, nations have a choice
between thinking of terrorist attacks as large crimes (on the model of
organized crime or other criminal conspiracies) or as small wars (on the
model of insurgent attacks)."l2
The designation of terrorism controls the level of rights suspects are
afforded either under international humanitarian law on one track" or the
U.S. Constitutionl 4  and international human rights conventions on
another.'5 There are many differences between these two sets of laws. For
example, while humanitarian law allows military officials to kill enemy
combatants,' 6 the constitutional and humanitarian rights laws emphasizes
the "right to life" limiting the government's right to use lethal force.'7
12. Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the
Temptations of9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1023 (2004).
13. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; see also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
14. Anthony Romero, The Constitution Applies to All Americans, No Matter What They are
Accused of ACLU (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-racial-
justice/constitution-applies-all-americans-no-matter-what-they-are (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
15. See generally Fact Sheet 32, supra note 5.
16. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC), Interpretive Guidance on the Notion ofDirect
Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, Part IX Restraints on the Use of
Force in Direct Attack, 90 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 991, 996 (2009), available at
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf (last visited Oct 19, 2014);
see also Nils Meltzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion ofDirect Participation in Hostilities, ICRC,
82 n.221 (2009), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf
(last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (while nations are permitted to kill, one should note the statement of Red
Cross Chief, Jean Picet:
If we can put a soldier out of action by capturing him, we should not wound him.
If we can obtain the same result by wounding him, we must not kill him. If there
are two means to achieve the same military advantage, we must choose the one
which causes the lesser evil. The law of war permits armed forces to defeat the
enemy but does not provide an unlimited license to kill.).
17. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No.
95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 art. 6, Tl, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx ("Every human being has the inherent
right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.") (last
visited Oct. 19, 2014) [hereinafter ICCPR].
Further, human rights law requires criminals to be afforded certain
protections in court, enemy combatants suspected of war crimes can be
prosecuted by military commissions which "lack the protection afforded in
the federal courts."' 9 As such, while there are rules that nations must
follow in the midst of an armed conflict, they are quite distinct from the
rules requisite during times of peace when criminal activity is occurring.
This is especially true when one considers the applicability of domestic
constitutional law as applied to the surveillance of terrorism suspects.
In the aftermath of the PATRIOT Act, the Bush administration
attempted to argue that neither the Constitution nor humanitarian law
applied to terrorism suspects. 20 This was followed with arguments that the
domestic U.S. courts were ill-equipped to handle sensitive terrorism cases,
often involving suspects apprehended overseas.2 1 However, both the
United States and Pakistan have developed an extensive history of common
law jurisprudence protecting constitutional civil liberties during peacetimes
to deal with criminal behavior.22
This was true for the United States with acts of terrorism prior to 9/11.
The Clinton administration saw several terrorist attacks on American
interests, including the bombing of two U.S. Embassies in Africa and the
Oklahoma City bombing on a federal building which left nearly 200 dead,
including children.23 However, "under the Clinton administration, terrorist
attacks were seen primarily as big crimes with a small war component.
They were handled as a first matter by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
18. Id. at art. 9(1) ("Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law."; see also id at art. 9(3) (Anyone
suspected of a crime, "shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release.").
19. Emanuel Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights in The United States:
The Aftermath ofSeptember 11, 2001, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 14 (2002).
20. David Turns, The "War on Terror" Through British and International Humanitarian Law
Eyes: Comparative Perspectives on Selected Legal Issues, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 435, 437 (2007) (citing
151 CONG. REc. S12657-58 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005)). (Senator Bingaman stated:
The administration has gone to great lengths to avoid the legal restraints that
normally would apply under our legal system. They have argued that the laws of
war are not applicable because we are fighting a new type of enemy. They have
argued the criminal laws are not applicable because we are fighting a war.)
21. See id. at 439.
22. Scheppele, supra note 12; see generally Mehram v. Federation of Pakistan, (1998) PLD
(SC) 1445 (Pak.).
23. OKLAHOMA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SUMMARY OF REPORTABLE INJURIES IN
OKLAHOMA (1998), http://www.ok.gov/health2/documents/OKCBombing.pdf (last visited Oct. 19,
2014).
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ordinary criminal courts, even when they pertained to attacks on U.S.
interests overseas." 24 After Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attacks
on the U.S. embassies, Clinton engaged in a war-like act by ordering the
aerial bombing of several Al-Qaeda training facilities in 1998.25
However, the more substantive reaction from the President came
through criminal prosecutions of suspects in civilian courts, where "four
defendants-including one American citizen-were tried in the federal
District Court for the Southern District of New York in the spring of 2001
for plotting and participating in the attacks."26 In that case, "several months
of evidence-including reports from FBI field officers, results of electronic
monitoring, physical evidence obtained through searches in multiple
countries, and confessions gathered in extensive interrogations abroad-
resulted in convictions of all four defendants on all counts." 27
Rather than approaching terrorist acts as acts of war requiring military
tribunals,
[I]t appeared from the Clinton administration's antiterrorism
efforts that it believed the ordinary criminal justice system was
an effective tool for ensuring that those who plotted against the
United States and attempted to kill its citizens could be brought
to justice on the basis of public evidence in normal criminal
proceedings. And the results-guilty verdicts in all cases-
seemed to bear that belief out.28
Further, despite deriding the judiciary's ability to handle terrorism cases,
the Bush administration successfully prosecuted 190 suspects in U.S.
courts, according to President Obama.29
Pakistan has also successfully prosecuted terrorism cases in the past
without the reliance of military commissions. 3 0 The Anti-Terrorism Act
was originally passed in 1997 as a means to set up a "parallel system of
justice" that would be "unencumbered by the procedural niceties of the
24. Scheppele, supra note 12.
25. The 1998 Attack, WASHNGTONPOST.COM, (Oct. 3, 2001) available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/graphics/attack/zone 8.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
26. Scheppele, supra note 12.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Ari Shapiro, Just How Many Terrorists Has The US. Convicted?, NPR.ORG (Feb. 11,
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1 23571858 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
30. Charles H. Kennedy, The Creation and Development ofPakistan's Anti-terrorism Regime,
1997-2002, in RELIGIOUS RACISM AND SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA, 387, 389 (Satu P. Linaye, Robert G.
Wirsing, Mohan Malik, ed. 2004).
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regular court system." 3 1 The Act criminalized a litany of acts, including,
"murder, the malicious insult of the religious beliefs of any class, the use of
derogatory remarks in respect of the holy personages, kidnapping and forms
of robbery." 32 However, the act allowed the Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC)
to overlook constitutional protections for the accused with regards to
evidentiary and procedural rules that would otherwise apply in civilian
courts.33 The Supreme Court of Pakistan resoundingly overturned this part
of the law in Mehmal v. Federation of Pakistan, which concerned the
terrorist bombing of a federal court building.3 4 Despite being the targets of
terrorist groups, the judges on the Supreme Court held that the Anti-
Terrorism Act could not weaken the rights of the accused in the ATCs, and
that the rules of evidence established by civilian courts would have to be
followed. There are considerably transparent problems with the ATCs, as
is evidenced by their four percent conviction rate for terror suspects, which
will be discussed in Part II of this study.36 Also, one cannot forget that the
Pakistani military has led operations within the country that confront
terrorists as combatants engaged in a civil war against the state.3 7  In a
recent operation, the military reported killing 910 terrorists while losing
eighty-two soldiers. 38  Further, the Army Act was amended in 200739 to
allow military tribunals to have jurisdiction over civilians for prosecuting
31. Id.
32. Id. at 390 n.3.
33. See id. at 387-417.
34. Major Incidents of Terrorism-related violence in Pakistan: 1988-2004, SATP (South
Asian Terrorism Portal) (Jan. 18, 1997) available at
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorinc2004.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014)
("Sipah-e-Sahaba Chief Maulana Ziaur Rehman Farooqi is killed along with 18 other persons in a bomb
blast in the Lahore Sessions Court.").
35. Kennedy, supra note 30.
36. See generally Zofeen T. Ebrahim, Poor Security for Witnesses Means Low Conviction
Rate, DAWN (Dec. 6, 2007), http://www.dawn.com/news/769312/poor-security-for-witnesses-means-
low-conviction-rate (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
37. See generally Qudssia Akhlaque, It's 'Operation Sunrise' not 'Silence', DAWN INTERNET
EDITION (July 12, 2007), http://web.archive.org/web/20080304014535 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (one
such operation ordered by General Pervez Musharraf in 2007 targeted a mosque housing extremists in
one of Pakistan's major cities, Lahore).
38. Army says 910 'Terrorists,' 82 Soldiers Killed in North Waziristan, DAWN (Sept. 3,
2014), available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1129619 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
39. Amendments to Law Under Emergency Rule: Pakistan Or., No. 66 of 2007 to amend the
Pakistan Army Act, 1952, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 2007), http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2007/pakistanl207/5.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
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crimes including murder and libel,40 though its use has been limited in
recent years. However, outside these limited cases the bulk of terrorist
suspects are brought before the ATCs, which evidences Pakistan's early
response to terrorism as a criminal issue that must be handled with the same
form used by civilian courts and the rules applied to any other crime.4 1
B. Emergency Times: The Open Door to Imperial Presidency
In the aftermath of 9/11, "[u]nder the Bush administration, terrorist
attacks have been seen within the framework of not just a small war, but of
a world war."4 2 As such, the rich jurisprudence established by civilian
courts prosecuting terrorists was all but rejected, vesting power mainly in
the executive branch.43 The Bush administration invoked Paul Schmitt's
ideal that a "state suspends the law in the exception on the basis of its right
of self-preservation," or rather, the leader of a country has the power to
suspend its laws in order to save the country from ruin.
This invocation of emergency is what Kim Lane Scheppele points to
that allows executives to "gain great powers, 'powers that were used to
justify both the use of force abroad and restrictions on rights at home."'45
She went on to explain that "each new threat, however slight, justified
changing what had been the normal rules of procedure to cope with the new
form of danger.""6 The same can be said for "national security" concerns,
which Daniel Yergin wrote:
[W]hat characterizes the concept of national security . . . [is]
[v]irtually every development in the world is perceived to be
40. See 'Amended Army Act Proves Pakistan is Under Martial Law', DAILY TIMES (Nov. 12,
2007) available at http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/12-Nov-2007/amended-arny-act-proves-
pakistan-is-under-martial-law (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
41. Kennedy, supra note 30.
42. Scheppele, supra note 12, at 1023.
43. See generally John Fabian Witt, Anglo-American Empire and the Crisis of the Legal
Frame (Will the Real British Empire Please Stand Up?), 120 HARV. L. REV. 754 (2007) (reviewing
NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE BRITISH WORLD ORDER AND THE LESSONS
FOR GLOBAL POWER (2004); DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD (2005); R. W. KOSTAL, A
JURISPRUDENCE OF POWER: VICTORIAN EMPIRE AND THE RULES OF LAW (2005); JOHN YOO, THE
POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005)).
44. CARL SCHMITr, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGN I Y 12 (George Schwab trans., the MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London,
England 1985).
45. Scheppele, supra note 12, at 1024.
46. Id.
potentially crucial. An adverse turn of events anywhere
endangers the United States. Problems in foreign relations are
viewed as urgent and immediate threats. Thus, desirable foreign
policy goals are translated into issues of national survival, and
the range of threats becomes limitless. The doctrine is
characterized by expansiveness, a tendency to push the subjective
boundaries of security outward to more and more areas, to
encompass more and more geography and more and more
problems. It demands that the country assume a posture of
military preparedness; the nation must be on permanent alert.47
As such, declarations of emergency or laws bom out of an emergency
situation allow for the executive branch to expand its powers citing to the
amorphous "national security" without the traditional check from other
branches of government.48  This has continued since the Cold War such
that:
[T]he American presidency is as strong, if not stronger, than
ever. The practical deference of courts to the political branches
is nearly universal on all matters of foreign and military policy,
including outsized claims of national security. Congress has
largely ceded its powers in the realm of foreign policy ... 49
The "imperial presidency" has taken shape throughout the history of
the United States, as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. argued in his seminal work;
however, the president's invocation of national security after 9/11 "has
meant that he has not needed to otherwise justify or explain his course of
action,"o which has certainly concentrated power to the president unlike
before. As such, President Bush began the trend, which President Obama
has carried forth, of avoiding judicial and congressional checks by "trying
to bring the war on terrorism entirely within the executive branch and
minimizing the influence of both Congress and the courts ....
Authoritarianism has a far more developed history in Pakistan, where
"in the 59 years since Pakistan became an independent state, the military
has overthrown democratic governments three times . . . on each occasion
(military leadership) chose to dismiss the government and hold fresh
47. DANIEL YERGIN, SHATTERED PEACE: THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 196, 336-38 (Boston Houghton Mifflin Co. 1977).
48. Id.
49. Scheppele, supra note 12, at 1022.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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elections, instead of replacing the democratic system."52 One of the first
examples dates back to General Zia Ul Haq's dictatorial regime, which
passed the Eighth Amendment in 1985 that "vested sweeping authority in
the presidency-which remained closely associated with the military-at
the expense of the Prime Minister and Parliament,"5 3 creating a civilian
martial law system of government. 54
The most recent emergency was declared by General Pervez
Musharraf, who dissolved Parliament and attempted to disband the
judiciary by placing judges and their families under house arrest.55 Earlier
in his rule, Musharraf politicized the use of the ATC in order to consolidate
his power in the executive branch.56  The most glaring example was the
ATC case against Nawaz Sharif, a politician who Musharraf removed from
power through a coup. 57  Sharif was sentenced to life in jail but his
punishment was commuted to exile, which many perceived as a political
move by the Musharraf administration to remove any challenge to their
executive authority.58
After 9/11, Musharraf became a close ally with the Bush
administration in the War on Terror, but often used his position as an ally to
tighten his grip of control over the country.59 It is alleged that after forming
the alliance with the United States, "the Musharraf regime had started the
practice of secretly detaining people . . . . [some allege that] the missing
persons were mostly political adversaries from Baluchistan," rather than
52. See Aditya Bhave & Christopher Kingston, Military Coups and the Consequences of
Durable De Facto Power: the Case of Pakistan, DEP'T ECON. U. CHI. & DEP'T ECON. AMHERST C. 2,
27 (2009).
53. See Shoaib A. Ghias, Miscarriage of Chief Justice: Judicial Power and the Legal
Complex in Pakistan Under Musharraf 35 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 985 (2010).
54. See PAULA R. NEWBERG, JUDGING THE STATE: COURTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
IN PAKISTAN 26, 190-91 (Cambridge University Press ed., 1995).
55. See Ghias, supra note 53, at 985.
56. We Can Torture, Kill or Keep you for Years, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 39 (July 2011),
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/pakistan0711 Weblnside.pdf (last visited Oct.
19, 2014) ("Scores of government opponents including lawyers remain in prison across the country
today . . . thousands have been released, but the fear of being re-arrested hangs over them as charges
against them under the Anti-Terrorism Act remain on file.").
57. Id.
58. See Kennedy, supra note 30, at 399-401 (the government's case against the former prime
minister was designed to bring criminal charges against Nawaz Sharif, which if successful would
effectively end his political career, and to absolve Chief Executive Musharraf from any liability
associated with staging the military coup of October 12).
59. See Kennedy, supra note 30, at 407-08.
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Taliban or Al-Qaeda members. 6 0  These Baloch adversaries were
nationalists that threatened the unitary rule of Musharraf by declaring their
desire for separation from the country.6' These demands were met with
disappearances, extrajudicial murders, and torture, none of which were
prosecuted due to the invocation of "national security" in the War on
Terror.62 Asma Jahangir, a leading human rights attorney in Pakistan,
stated that "General Musharraf wanted absolute power and that he would
not tolerate any dissent and would continue to use the 'terrorist card' to
keep the international community at bay."6 The ability to disappear
citizens and deny knowledge of their whereabouts is perhaps the clearest
mark of an imperial executive branch that is not subject to constitutional
limitations based largely by the "time of emergency" justification.
C. Emergency Times: Court-Cutting
The invocation of emergency situation doctrine allows for the
executive branch to expand its power base beyond constitutional limits.
This is especially detrimental to nations that champion civil liberties like
the United States and Pakistan, which require separation of powers and an
independent judicial branch." Post 9/11 national security laws have
disregarded this practice, as the ACLU explained regarding the PATRIOT
Act, it "continues an alarming trend known as court-stripping-removing
authority from the judiciary-in time of crisis . . . . As it has done in times
of past tragedy, the government responded by passing legislation that
reduces or eliminates the process of judicial review and erodes our civil
liberties."6 5
Scheppele explains that "the avoidance of separation of powers
constraints in the domestic war on terrorism has reached its height with the
60. See Ghias, supra note 53, at 985.
61. See generally Malik Siraj Akbar, National Endowment of Democracy Presentation,
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT OF DEMOCRACY (May 2, 2012), available at http://www.ned.org/docs/Malik-
Siraj-Akbar-PowerPoint-Presentation.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
62. We Can Torture, Kill or Keep you for Years, supra note 56.
63. AmendedArmy Act Proves Pakistan is Under Martial Law, supra note 40.
64. See John T. Philipsbom, Unsteadily To Center Stage: An Overview ofPakistan's Justice
System, 85 JUDICATURE 228, 230 (2002) (much like the United States, "Pakistan has stayed with a
constitutional basis for government, providing for executive, legislative, and judicial branches; the
separation of powers; and the protection of personal rights under the law.").
65. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, New Anti-Terrorism Law Continues
Dangerous Trend of Stripping Federal Judiciary of Authority (Nov. 1, 2001),
https://www.aclu.org/national-security/new-anti-terrorism-law-continues-dangerous-trend-stripping-
federal-judiciary-autho (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
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claimed presidential power to label suspect individuals as enemy
combatants who are immune from legal process altogether."'66 The purely
executive designation process was deemed incomplete and overly abusive
by the Supreme Court in Hamdan and other Guantanamo Bay cases.
While cases such as Hamdan demonstrate that the Court has voiced its
dissent to the stripping of their power post 9/11, judges
[H]ave since become quite deferential to the Bush
administration's rationales for the declarations of exception to
states of normal legality. At times of crisis, the system of
separation of powers and the system for protection of human
rights seem to collapse into the one constitutional clause that
gives the commander in chief his powers.
Despite their deference, Richard Weich argues that post-9/11 programs,
created through the PATRIOT Act, effectively silence judicial overview
and "reflect a distrust of the judiciary as an independent safeguard against
abuse of executive authority."69
The two phenomena described above, the ever-expanding imperial
presidency and the never-ending justification of national security, were
achieved through the passage of the PATRIOT Act, which "significantly
alters the court system's supervision of the executive in its investigation of
routine criminal matters unconnected to terrorism."70  As more and more
issues are categorized under national security, the president's power has
grown significantly under the Bush and Obama administrations, at the cost
of the court's power. Emmanuel Gross rejects such notions of over-
empowerment by arguing that there is a heightened need for judicial review
when the government's actions concern national security, "if only because
of the fear that such actions might infringe on an individual's right to
privacy based merely on an assertion of national security.,71
While U.S. judges have remained silent on certain issues categorized
as national security, they did not create a "Doctrine of Necessity" as the
66. Scheppele, supra note 12, at 1053.
67. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 (2006) (in Hamdan v. US.,
Justice Stevens rejected the government's reliance on "exigency alone" to prohibit Article III Courts'
from acting upon their duties to scrutinize the legality of executive action following 9/11).
68. Scheppele, supra note 12, at 1078.
69. See Ronald Weich, Upsetting Checks and Balances-Congressional Hostility Toward the
Courts in Times of Crisis, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 2001), available at http://
www.aclu.org/congress/courtstripping.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
70. See generally USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 7.
71. Gross, supra note 19, at 32.
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Pakistan Supreme Court did in order to legitimize illegal actions by the
executive branch.72 In three landmark cases, the Pakistan Court applied the
Doctrine of Necessity, which resembles the "emergency" arguments made
by the Bush and Obama administrations to expand the imperial or unitary
presidency.7 3 This principle simply asserts, "that which is illegal, necessity
can make legal" and has been used to justify unconstitutional coups by
military dictators who either manipulated or silenced members of the
judiciary.74 However, this doctrine has been all but abandoned by the
current Supreme Court bench, which is inhabited by individuals that were
part of the 2008 Lawyers Movement.75  This Movement started after
Musharraf declared emergency in 2007 and attempted to have all judges be
sworn in with a new oath that would recognize the legality of his illegal
dictatorship. This act was far more of an offensive attack by the executive
against the judiciary than the court-stripping. provisions of the PATRIOT
Act. Yet, the Chief Justice.stood firm and refused to take the oath, which
instigated Musharraf to remove him and place him on house arrest. This
triggered the Lawyers Revolution to mobilize and eventually bring down
the dictatorial regime through non-violent legal means. Since then, the
Supreme Court has pressed hard against the executive branch and the
military on issues including disappearances of persons during the War on
Terror.79 Unfortunately, despite the Court taking notice on disappearances
and torture cases, little progress has been made to make Army officials
legally accountable for their actions, as they have long-enjoyed immunity.80
Even still, no one can deny that the institution has attempted to carve out a
72. See Hon. Nasira Iqbal, A View from Pakistan, 36 WTR HUM. RTS. 21 (2009).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Ghias, supra note 53, at 985.
77. See Amanullah Shah, Critical Study of the Factors undermining Independence of the
Superior Judiciary in Pakistan, Institute/University/Department Details, GOMAL U. OF DERA ISMAIL
KHAN 64 (2008), available at https://www.google.com/url?sa-t&rct-j&q=&esrc=s&source-web&cd=1
&cad=ra&uact-8&ved=0CCAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fprr.hec.gov.pk%2FThesis%2F56S.pdf&
ei=Rb8oVLSOLoulyAT06oKoCw&usg=AFQjCNFBGzFUAWQEYYPABgxAjO4gTpuL5w&sig2=Nh
RX1_ZooY5Jzkz6rkseQ&bvm=bv.76247554,d.aWw (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
78. See Ghias, supra note 53, at 985.
79. See generally Syed Shoaib Hasan, Top Pakistani Court Confronts Military on Missing
Persons, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Apr. 22, 2014), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SBl 0001424052702304279904579515904217544292 (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
80. See No Progress on Missing Persons Made: Supreme Court, BUS. REC. REP., (Dec. 6,
2012), available at http://www.brecorder.com/top-stories/595:/1264757:no-progress-on-missing-
persons-made-supreme-court/?date=2012-12-06 (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
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space for its active participation even in the era of terrorism, where judicial
bodies have been less respected and relied upon.
One of the leaders of the Lawyer's Revolution, Aitizaz Ahsan, rightly
stated that it is in times of crisis that the judiciary should be relied upon
more frequently:
[T]he existence of an independent and functioning judiciary is
quite crucial to the prosecution of this form of war, which
President Bush dubbed as a 'War on Terror'. The implication is
evident. Without an independent judiciary, a contestant cannot
win this form of war. I praise the judicial system in the USA. It
is fiercely independent, and its Judiciary has challenged its
Executive over Guantanamo Bay and over detention without
trial. It is simple. An independent judicial system has to be
provided in this theater of war. It is the people in that area that
matter.
D. Individual Rights Under Attack
The court should act during times of crisis to maintain the
constitutionally mandated balance of powers between branches, as it serves
to protect civilians from illegal acts by the government in pursuit of
* 82* *security. The revocation of civil rights in response to a security crisis is
not a new phenomenon for the United States as the ACLU explains,
"[t]hroughout U.S. history 'national security' has often been used as a
pretext for massive violations of individual right[s]."83 The ACLU went on
to explain that while the nation geared up for the fight against terrorism
after 9/11, the government launched "a serious civil liberties crisis."84
Similarly another national government organization has stated that the war
on terror "could become a war on all American citizens" due to
81. Aitzaz Ahsan, The Preservation of the Rule of Law in Times of Strife, 43 INT. LAW. I
(2009).
82. See Jacob R. Lilly, National Security at What Price?: A Look Into Civil Liberty Concerns
in the Information Age Under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and a Proposed Constitutional Test for
Future Legislation, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 447, 465 (2003) ("[T]he judicial branch cannot
abandon its oversight duties in the midst of ever-changing technology and threats to national security
but must develop constitutional tests that can effectively balance the competing interests of national
security and individual rights.").
83. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL SECURITY, available at
https://www.aclu-nj.org/theissues/nationalsecurity/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
84. Id
[Vol. 21:1
overpowered presidents that disregard "meaningful judicial review and
respect due individual rights and liberties."
While specific rights regarding citizens' right to privacy and the
prohibition on unwarranted or unreasonable searches and seizures will be
discussed in the following section, it is worthwhile to examine the practical
need for preserving rights in response to terrorism. As the United States
has increasingly retracted many civil liberties in an effort to deal with
terrorism, "many of America's allies have seen 9/11 not as a moment when
the rule of law should be suspended, but precisely a moment when the rule
of law needs to be strengthened."8 This coincides with the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of Pakistan, who argued that "in any war, the most
effective weapon is a population with enforceable rights." 87 By providing
fair trials and checking the excesses of executive power, the judiciary
serves an invaluable function as nations develop methods to deal with
terrorism.
Disappearing, kidnapping, torturing, rendering, and killing individuals
are all activities which terrorists have engaged in, but nations have
increasingly used the same illegal methods to battle terrorism. As such, if
legal rights are disregarded, what ideological difference or advantage could
the American or Pakistani government offer over terrorist groups?
Maria Vogel Short explains that laws like the PATRIOT Act "tip the
scales against civil liberties, effectively playing into the hands of terrorists
bent on derailing democratic systems." She went on to quote Lawrence
Lustberg, President of the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of
New Jersey, who aptly stated, "there are general tests of reasonableness or
balancing tests for wiretaps. When that balancing act is changed, terrorism
has won."89 Gross goes further to state that laws like the PATRIOT Act
which pose dangers to democracy also limit the ability of the public to be
unified in its fight against terror, leading to "fear and anxiety being
voiced."90 He states that, "[t]he terrorist attack against the United States on
September 11, 2001 threatened the freedoms of the nation in a concrete
manner. The United States must be careful to ensure that its anti-terrorist
legislation will not threaten these freedoms even more." 91 As such, a
commitment to the civil liberties of citizens and respect for the active
85. See Schultz, supra note 1, at 206 n.77.
86. Scheppele, supra note 12, at 1004.
87. Ahsan, supra note 81.
88. Gross, supra at note 19, n.155.
89. Id at 14.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id. at 14.
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involvement of the judiciary in protecting those liberties are key changes
that need to take place if Pakistan and the United States wish to confront
and eradicate the spread of terrorism. 92
III. USA SURVEILLANCE
A. Individual Rights Regarding Surveillance
Surveillance by executive agencies has been limited traditionally by
the Supreme Court in its analysis of the Fourth Amendment, which
prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures."93  In various decisions, the
Supreme Court determined that even though the Constitution did not
explicitly guarantee a citizen the right of privacy, the conjunctive effect of
many of the amendments in the Bill of Rights creates a zone of privacy free
from government intrusion. 94 While wiretap surveillance was not covered
under the Fourth Amendment analysis at first, the Court in Katz v. United
States held that when the privacy a person justifiably relies upon was
invaded when wiretapped, wiretapping constitutes a search and seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.95 In United States v. United
States District Court (Keith), "the Court concluded that the warrant clause
of the Fourth Amendment applied to investigations of domestic security
threats."9 6
B. Judicial Supervision of Surveillance: Checks and Balances
While the Fourth Amendment protects individual citizens, it also plays
into the system of checks and balances by empowering the judiciary to
92. See generally Fact Sheet 32, supra note 5.
93. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
94. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (The Court stated:
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in
the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third
Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in
time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy.
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to
surrender to his detriment .... ).
95. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
96. See Jonathan W. Gannon, From Executive Order to Judicial Approval. Tracing the
History of Surveillance of U.S. Persons Abroad in Light of Recent Terrorism Investigations, 6 J. NAT'L
SEC. L. & POL'Y 59, 76-77 (2012).
[Vol. 21:1
supervise searches proposed by the executive branch as explained by the
Court in Katz:
Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if
domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within
the discretion of the Executive Branch. The Fourth Amendment
does not contemplate the executive officers of Government as
neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and
responsibility are to enforce the laws, to investigate, and to
prosecute. But those charged with this investigative and
prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of when to
utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks.97
However, in all the cases described above, "the court explicitly
declined to address whether electronic surveillance of foreign governments
or their agents also required a prior warrant." 9 8 In fact, Justice Byron wrote
in his concurrence for Katz that, "[w]e should not require the warrant
procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of the United
States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the
requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as
reasonable." 99
C. FISA Creation
In the absence of rules governing wiretapping of foreign nationals by
national security agencies and the Church Committee discoveries,100
Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which
regulated the CIA and FBI's surveillance activity domestically.'01 The Act
formally granted powers to these intelligence organizations and created a
"secure framework by which the Executive Branch may conduct legitimate
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes within the context
of this Nation's commitment to privacy and individual rights." 10 2 Several
powers were granted to the executive branch including the right to conduct
secret electronic surveillance "under a standard less strict than [the]
97. U.S. v. U.S. D. Ct. MI., 407 U.S. 297, 301, 316-17 (1972).
98. Kelly R. Cusick, Thwarting Ideological Terrorism: Are We Brave Enough to Maintain
Civil Liberties in the Face of Terrorist Induced Trauma, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 55, 57 (2003).
99. Katz, 389 U.S. at 364.
100. Cusick, supra note 98, at 58 ("[I]nstances where United States intelligence agencies had
used unfettered warrantless electronic surveillance on United States citizens who were unrelated to any
source of foreign intelligence information and unassociated with any criminal activity.").
101. See S. Rep. No. 95-604, supra note 9; see also Whilt, supra note 9, at 361.
102. S. Rep. No. 95-604, supra note 9, at 15.
412014] Husain
42 ILSA Journal ofInternational & Comparative Law
probable cause standard of criminal investigation . .. without providing the
notice required in a criminal investigation."'
0 3
These executive powers were checked and balanced with a judicial
role in the wiretap process through the creation of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC).104 This Court is composed of eleven federal
judges, who can grant warrants for wiretap surveillance on "agents of a
foreign power."'s Daniel Saperstein explains:
[U]nder the specified classifications of FISA . . . agents of a
foreign power, are subject to wiretapping probes if the guidelines
for the issuance of an order are properly followed. FISA
established that the evidentiary standard of probable cause is
necessary to warrant labeling a target of electronic surveillance a
foreign power or agent of a foreign power, and to determine if
the facilities or places kept under surveillance are being or are
about to be used by a foreign power or agent of a foreign
106power.
D. PATRIOTAct Effects on Wiretapping
Before 9/11, FISC established a wall between the FBI and the
Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), inhibiting the
FBI and other intelligence agencies such as the CIA and the National
Security Agency (NSA) from sharing intelligence information with criminal
investigators. 0 7  This wall was constructed based on the distinction
between intelligence gathering and law enforcement, because "[d]omestic
law enforcement is a policy area that must respect the constitutional
protections and due process rights of those suspected of committing crimes
... . However, foreign intelligence gathering is generally exempt from a
rigid application of these protections."' 08 Therefore, the wall was in place
to ensure that evidence obtained through surveillance granted by the FISC
103. Cusick, supra note 98, at 58.
104. William Michael, A Window on Terrorism: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 58
NOV BENCH & B. MINN. 23, 24 (2011).
105. Daniel Saperstein, The European Counterterrorists as the Next U.S. Cold Warrior: Why
the United States Should Select from the German and British Models of Procedure, Evidence, and
Oversight for National Security Wiretapping, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1947, 1963 (2008).
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 1960.
108. Schultz, supra note 1, at 209-10.
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would be used purely for intelligence and not for criminal investigatory
purposes.109
Yet, in the aftermath of 9/11, "[t]he war on terrorism breached a wall
traditionally distinguishing foreign policy, national security, and
intelligence gathering from domestic law enforcement."" 0 The PATRIOT
Act removes the distinction between monitoring for investigative purposes
and monitoring for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence."' This
expands the power of intelligence agencies to share information for the dual
purpose of intelligence collection and criminal investigation, 112 and allows
the CIA to violate the Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. citizens."13
Further, the Act changed the standard for validating a search. 1 14
Previously, in order to receive a warrant from the FISC, the government
had to prove that its only purpose for wiretapping was for intelligence-
gathering." 5 The PATRIOT Act changed this from an "only purpose" to a
"significant purpose" standard, thus greatly expanding the scope of
situations for which intelligence agencies could be granted a warrant, even
if their intention was a criminal investigation rather than intelligence
gathering.116 As the Daily Record explains,
[T]he result is that: Under the new law only a 'significant
purpose,' as opposed to 'the purpose' of the investigation is
needed to sidestep the warrant requirement . . . . This
fundamental shift poses a serious threat to our constitutionally
109. See Cedric Logana, The FISA Wall and Federal Investigations, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
209 (2009).
110. Schultz, supra note 1, at 210.
111. See Elizabeth Bazan, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the
Statutory Framework and Recent Judicial Decisions, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Apr. 21, 2005),
available at http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB178/surv3O.pdf (last visited Oct. 14,
2014).
112. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 7, at § 504 (creating 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(k)(1), 1825(k)(1))
(the USA PATRIOT Act provided that, with respect to both physical searches and electronic
surveillance, federal officers executing a FISA warrant "may consult with Federal law enforcement
officers to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect against"); see also Logana, supra note 109.
113. See How the Anti-Terrorism Bill Puts CIA Back in the Business of Spying on Americans,
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 23, 2001), https://www.aclu.org/print/national-security/how-
anti-terrorism-bill-puts-cia-back-business-spying-americans (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
114. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 7.
115. Cusick, supra note 98, at 62-63.
116. Id. at 63-64.
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protected privacy rights and alters the checks and balances
critical to our governmental structure.117
E. Attacks on Wiretap Standards for Terrorism Suspects
As the executive branch has expanded its list of exclusive powers
under the justification that greater powers are needed to deal with the War
on Terror, many have attempted to attack the FISA courts and the warrant
requirements all together.1 8 John Yoo, former Bush administration legal
counsel, argued that intelligence agencies need to move quickly to stop
terrorist plots,119 and "bemoaned the government's high burden to establish
the rough equivalent of probable cause for the criminal justice system." 20
Other members of the intelligence community, including the Director
of National Intelligence, Michael McConnell, have also attacked the need
for probable cause under FISA. He has stated in a House Judiciary
Committee testimony that proving probable cause for warrants costs
"substantial expert resources toward preparing applications . . . [diverting
them] from the job of analyzing collection results and finding new leads, to
writing justifications that would demonstrate their targeting selections
would satisfy the statute, creating an 'intolerable situation."' 1 21 This view
is echoed by Professor Emanuel Gross who stated that the nature of
international terrorism is such that it makes it "difficult to obtain the
information necessary to meet the strict standard of probable cause,"1 22 and
that "[t]errorism involves a network that covers the world, and it is not
always possible to point to the specific person who intends to commit a
specific act."1 23  While Gross suggests that this standard should be
abandoned to deal with terrorism, perhaps allowing for warrantless
surveillance of terrorism suspects, Kelly Cusick comes to a different
conclusion based on the same facts. She asserts that "terrorist group[s]
117. Gross, supra note 19, at 30-31.
118. JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES: PAPERS FROM THE
MARCH 2003 COUNTER-TERRORISM & CIVIL LIBERTIES CONFERENCE (2003), http://www.ucmo.edu/
cjinst/issue3.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
119. See John Yoo, The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Constitution, 14 GEO. MASON
L. REv. 565, 572 (2007).
120. Saperstein, supra note 105, at 1958 (2009).
121. Warrantless Surveillance and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: The Role of
Checks and Balances in Protecting Americans' Privacy Rights (Part II): Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, I10th Cong. 21 (2007) (statement of J.M. McConnell, Director of National
Intelligence) (speaking specifically to surveying targets outside the United States).
122. Gross, supra at note 19.
123. Id.
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[are] cautious, close-knit, and never purchase large amounts of illegal
material," which renders "wiretapping and other law enforcement
techniques" ineffective as preventative mechanisms. 124
F. Warrantless Surveillance
Rather than accepting critiques about the constitutionality of expanded
surveillance, the Bush administration sought greater unfettered secrecy in
its surveillance capabilities. In 2005, the New York Times discovered that
the Bush administration had authorized the NSA to conduct warrantless
wiretaps of American citizens, sidestepping the FISA courts all together. 12 5
Alberto Gonzalez explained that warrantless wiretaps were permitted under
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Act (AUMF) whenever
intelligence agencies determined that one party to a communication was
outside the United States and there was "a reasonable basis to conclude that
one party to the communication is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al
Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working
in support of al Qaeda."1 26
The program was criticized because it circumvented the FISC and was
seen as an attack on the power of the judiciary in supervising the searches
conducted by intelligence agencies. 127  Civil liberties advocates also
rebuked the "reasonable basis" standard because it offered far less
protection from illegal government intrusion than the previously established
"probable cause" standard.12 8
Though Congressional members from across the political spectrum
raised all of these critiques,129 the NSA program was officially made
permanent through the passage of the Protect America Act of 2007
124. Cusick, supra note 98, at 83.
125. James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, NEW
YORK TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/
16program.html?pagewanted=all& r-0 (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
126. Press Briefing, The White House, Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005)
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html (last visited Oct.
12, 2014).
127. Risen and Lichtblau, supra note 125.
128. See generally Jameel Jaffer, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board Public Hearing
on Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 19, 2014),
http://www.pclob.gov/Library/20140319-Testimony-Jaffer.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
129. See generally Conservative and Republican Voices Against President Bush's Warrantless
NSA Domestic Wiretap Program, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 8, 2006), available at
https://www.aclu.org/national-security/conservative-and-republican-voices-against-president-bush%
E2%80%99s-nsa-spying-program (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
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(PAA).130 This Act allowed the NSA to conduct electronic surveillance
without first seeking permission from the FISC.131 The PAA did, however,
create a system of internal checks for the NSA to follow before engaging in
warrantless surveillance, and further required the Agency to report any
warrantless surveillance seventy-two hours after conducting it.13 2
G. FISC Rubber Stamp
Prior to the passage of the PAA, the FISA court itself gave permission
to the NSA to conduct its program of surveillance, so long as they
maintained the probable cause standard, proving that the target of
surveillance is communicating with an agent of Al Qaeda or "affiliated
groups."l 33 While the court took limited steps in reigning in the NSA, FISC
has been critiqued in the past for failing to hold intelligence agencies, and
thereby the president, to a high standard when reviewing warrant
applications.134 Ronald Weich explains that "[m]any provisions of the
USA-PATRIOT Act limit judicial review of law enforcement activities
altogether, or create the illusion of judicial review while transforming
judges into mere rubber stamps.' 3  According to the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, since its establishment in 1979, the FISC has only
rejected eleven warrant applications, while granting 32,000 warrants.136
Some have "cited the lopsided statistics of wiretapping approvals by the
FISC as proof that FISA did not hinder intelligence gathering efforts."3
130. See Timothy B. Lee, How Congress unknowingly legalized PRISM in 2007, WASHINGTON
POST (June 6, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/06/
how-congress-unknowingly-legalized-prism-in-2007/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
131. Risen and Lichtblau, supra note 125.
132. THE WHITE HOUSE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S REVIEW
GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES (Dec. 12, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg final report.pdf (last visited Oct. 12,
2014).
133. Opening Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the Justice Department
Oversight Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Jan.
18, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/testimony/2007/agspeech_070118.html (last visited Oct.
12, 2014).
134. See generally id.
135. See Weich, supra note 69, at 5.
136. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 1979-2014, EPIC.ORG,
http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa-stats.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
137. Saperstein, supra note 105.
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H. Surveillance and Privacy in the Digital Age
For the most part, American jurisprudence and legislation concerning
privacy relates to historical concerns about the sanctity of the home,
however, in the age of information, "the government can enter homes and
businesses through a fiber optic cable and gain access to more persons,
houses, papers and effects than George III could have ever imagined, even
in his wildest dreams."1 3 8  As legal civil protections have failed to keep
pace with the proliferation of technology, it was disclosed by Edward
Snowden and Glenn Greenwald that U.S. executive agencies have engaged
in massive surveillance on millions of people around the world.14 0  This
included both telephone and internet communications. 14 1 Along with thirty-
five world leaders,142 the NSA has monitored communications from 193
countries including, and especially, Pakistan.14 3
The legal groundwork for one of the surveillance programs called
PRISM, was laid with the passage of the aforementioned PAA.'" The
Obama administration further qualified the PRISM program under Article
215 of the PATRIOT Act, which allows for the collection of any
information "relevant to an authorized investigation."l4 5 However, the
program has been criticized "that billions of records cannot possibly be
138. David F. Kelley, Taking Terabytes Out of the Constitution: Can We Fight Terrorism
without Big Brother?, 40 SPG VT. B.J. 16 (Spring 2014).
139. Chris J. Chasind, The Revolution will be Tweeted, but the Tweets will be Subpoenaed:
Reimagining Fourth Amendment Privacy to Protect Associational Anonymity, 2014 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL'Y 1, 4 (Spring 2014) ("Traditional constitutional and statutory protections for electronic information
have not kept pace with the ever-increasing role of technology in modem life.").
140. Edward Snowden, Whistle-Blower, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 1, 2014), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/opinion/edward-snowden-whistle-blower.html?_r-I (last visited
Oct. 14, 2014).
141. See Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism program taps in to user data of
Apple, Google and others, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
142. James Ball, NSA monitored calls of 35 world leaders after US official handed over
contacts, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-
surveillance-world-leaders-calls (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
143. Express Tribune Web Desk, US authorised NSA to spy on Pakistan among 193 countries,
THE EXPRESS TRIBUNE (July 1, 2014), http://tribune.com.pk/story/729521/us-authorised-nsa-to-spy-on-
pakistan-among-193-countries/?print-true (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
144. See Lee, supra note 130.
145. Id.
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relevant when a negligible portion of those records are actually linked to
terrorist activity."146
It was not just executive agencies engaged in this type of bulk
surveillance, but the FISC also played a role by ordering Internet and
telephone providers to supply the government with requested
information. 147  These revelations should provide a cautionary tale for the
creation of legislation like the PATRIOT Act, which renders useless the
longstanding and institutional limits previously placed upon governmental
intrusion of private information.
IV. PAKISTAN SURVEILLANCE
A. Individual Rights
Pakistan has experienced several periods of extrajudicial rule by the
military, but its Constitution has set out several civil liberties that have been
upheld by the judiciary and should be fully understood when discussing the
issue of surveillance.14 8 Most importantly, Article 14 of the Constitution
protects the inviolability of dignity of man, stating "the dignity of man and,
subject to law, the privacy of home shall be inviolable."l 4 9 Elaborating on
these rights, Article 10A guarantees the right to a fair trial, which balances
the right to privacy with the state's duty to investigate criminal matters.15 0
Additionally, Article 19 guarantees the right to information: "[e]very
citizen shall have the right to have access to information in all matters of
public importance subject to regulation and reasonable restrictions imposed
by law."' 5 '
The right to privacy was supported by the Pakistani Supreme Court in
its decision on the Hasba Bill, which was a provincial law that created an
office "with special powers to implement Islamic laws" in one of the
nation's provinces.15 2 The Court unanimously rejected the bill, stating that
146. Casey J. Mcgowan, The Relevance ofRelevance: Section 215 ofthe USA Patriot Act and
the Nsa Metadata Collection Program, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2399 (2014).
147. Glenn Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily,
THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-
verizon-court-order (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
148. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 2, ch. 1. IX.
149. See generally id.
150. ;d. at art. 10(a).
151. Id. at art. 19.
152. See Mohammad Kamran, Detailed Judgment on Hasba Bill: Hasba Restricts Basic
Rights, DAILY TIMES, (Sept. 1, 2005), available at http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/main/01-Sep-
2005/detailed-judgement-on-hasba-bill-hasba-restricts-basic-rights-sc (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
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"it is observed that private life, personal thoughts, and the individual beliefs
of citizens cannot be allowed to be interfered with."ss
B. Evidentiary Rules
More specifically, the nation's evidentiary rules and rules for criminal
procedure eschew limitations on the government when it is conducting
searches or surveillance of a private citizen.154 Under the Qanun-E-
Shahadat (Rules of Evidence) Order of 1984, the question of relevance is a
legal one rather than a logical one, unlike the United States' Rules of
Evidence.155 As such, material that would be deemed "inadmissible" in the
United States could be deemed all together irrelevant in Pakistan for the
same underlying reason, being illegally obtained.' 56 The Pakistani Rules of
Evidence grant expansive protections to the citizen including Sections 38
and 39, which state that a confession made to a police office or in police
custody "cannot be proven" or rather is irrelevant.'57 Further, a confession
made under a promise of secrecy or "in consequence of a deception
practiced on the accused purpose for obtaining it" will be rendered
irrelevant. 58  The evidence illegally obtained by police in the
aforementioned situations will be set aside, however, "rejection of evidence
shall not be ground of itself for a new trial or reversal of any decision in any
case, if it shall appear to the Court . . . [that] if the rejected evidence had
been received, it ought not to have varied the decision." 59 This is similar
to the provisions of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in the United
States, which prohibits the government from using evidence procured
illegally in a criminal case against the individual, but will allow other
evidence not tainted by the illegality of the search or seizure to be
submitted in the same case.160
153. Id.
154. See generally PAK. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 47.
155. See Justice Shabir Ahmed, An Introduction, SINDH JUDICIAL ACADEMY KARACi at 6,
available at http://sja.gos.pk/Publicaiton/JusticeShabbir/Introduction%20of%/2OQanoon-e-Shahadat.pdf
(last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
156. Id.
157. See Qanun-E-Shahdat Order, 1984, Sec. 38-39, available at http://www.punjabpolice.gov.
pk/system/files/qanun-e-shahadat-order-1 984.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
158. Id. at § 42.
159. Id. at § 162.
160. Fruit Of The Poisonous Tree Definition, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, available at
http://Iegal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.corn/Fruit+of+the+Poisonous+Tree (last visited Oct. 15, 2014.)
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The Rules of Criminal Procedure also set out rules for searches
conducted by police, when done so with a warrant.161 While the warrant
requirement is not enumerated in Pakistan's Constitution, as it is in the U.S.
Constitution, the Code of Criminal Procedure dates back to 1898 and
provides detailed procedures for arrest and search warrants. 16 2 Article 94
permits the Court or any officer in charge of a police station to produce a
summons or written order to a citizen who is in possession of any document
"necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry or
trial."1 63 This is a strikingly different standard from the U.S. system where
only the Court has the permission to allow a search. However, the
summons or written order described in Article 94 has less authority than a
search warrant, which is covered separately under Article 96.164 Article 96
states that if the Court "has reason to believe that the person to whom a
summons or order has been or might be addressed will not or would not
produce the document or thing as required" they may issue a search
warrant.16' This power is vested purely in the courts, and they can issue
warrants that have temporal and geographical limitations which police must
respect so as to ensure a minimum intrusion into the privacy of citizens. 166
There is a further check placed on police which limits them to the four
comers of the warrant because the searches under Article 96 must be made
in the presence of "two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality in
which the place to be searched is situated." 6 7  The use of witnesses is a
method to safeguard individual liberties and hold the police accountable,
mirroring the justification for the transparency requirements for arrest
warrants in the United States. 168
161. See Generally FED. R. CRIM. P.41.
162. See PAK. CODE CRIM. PROC., 1898 amended by The Political Parties (Amendment) Act,
No. 2 of 1997 PLD (Statutes) 94.
163. Id.
164. Id. at art. 96.
165. Id.
166. See PAK. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 94.
167. Id.
Search to be made in presence of witness. (1) Before making a search under this
Chapter, the officer or other person about to make it shall call upon two or more
respectable inhabitants of the locality in which the place to be searched is situate
to attend and witness the search and may issue an order in writing to them or any
of them so to do.
168. See generally PAK. CODE CRIM. PROC.
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C Extrajudicial Surveillance by Intelligence Agencies
These rules have traditionally applied to police but are not operable on
the intelligence agencies, which have a far greater involvement in terrorist
investigations.169  It is suspected that intelligence agencies like the Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) have conducted wire-tapping and other forms of
modem surveillance without any rules, guidelines, or limitations by the
judiciary for decades.17 0 As Zahid Hussain explains, "security agencies are
tempted to resort to extrajudicial measures in the absence of the rule of law
and judicial oversight."' 7 1 As such, not only have citizens been monitored,
but "thousands of people have been disappeared in the past years,
presumably taken away by intelligence and security agencies."l 72 This was
the case with the Adiala 11, where intelligence agents disappeared eleven
terror suspects after they had been acquitted by the Anti-Terrorism Courts
for their involvement of a bombing on an ISI bus.173  The suspects were
released due to a lack of admissible evidence.174 Along with allegations of
disappearing individuals, the ISI and Intelligence Bureau, (IB), have been
accused of wiretapping high-ranking politicians, judges, and civil servants
in order to blackmail them or attempt to ruin their careers. 1 As long as
security agencies can engage in such illegal operations without judicial
check, the rights of information, dignity, and privacy cannot be considered
to be functioning parts of the Pakistani Constitution.
D. Requirement for New Surveillance Legislation
Along with the problem of illegal activities by security agencies, there
is a recognizable problem with the acquittal rate of terrorist suspects.' 76
Some estimate that as low as four percent of terrorism cases tried by
169. Id.
170. See Zahid Hussain, A Fair Trial, DAWN (Sept. 11, 2012), available at
http://dawn.com/2012/09/1 1/a-fair-trial/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
171. Id. at 7.
172. Id. at 8.
173. Id.
174. SC orders agencies to release 7 Adiala inmates, PAKISTAN TODAY (Jan. 22, 2013),
available at http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/01/22/news/national/sc-orders-agencies-to-release-
7-adiala-inmates/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
175. Ardeshir Cowasjee, Villainy, DAWN WIRE SERVICE (Feb. 13, 1997), available at
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/spa/zohkohbOi282t94/Area%2OStudies/public/SouthAsia/SAserials/
Dawn/1997/13Feb97.html#natl (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
176. Abdur Rauf, Targeting Terrorism Only 4% of Suspects Convicted, EXPRESS TRIBUNE,
(Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/475313/targeting-terrorism-only-4-of-terror-
suspects-convicted (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
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civilian courts result in guilty verdicts. 177  The reasons for the lack of
convictions vary from the lack of witness protection to judges' fears of
retaliation by the terror groups if they attempt to enforce the law against
their members.178 However, one of the causes of the acquittal rates deals
with the admissibility and collection of electronic evidence through
surveillance, which was the impetus of the creation of the Fair Trial Act of
2012.179
While the Rules of Evidence provide for the Court to allow admission
of evidence procured through "modem devices or techniques," there were
no laws regulating modem surveillance.180 The Fair Trial Act's preamble
explains that
[E]xisting laws neither comprehensively provide for nor
specifically regulate advance[d] and modem investigative
techniques such as to cover surveillance and human intelligence,
property interference, wire-tapping and communication
interception are used extensively in other jurisdictions to prevent
the offences and as an indispensable aid to the law enforcement
and administration of justice.18 1
As such, some have claimed that the "Fair Trial bill is not only important
for prosecuting terrorists, but also for stopping extrajudicial practices. The
proposed legislation seeks to make investigation more transparent and
security and intelligence agencies accountable to the courts." 1 82  Abdul
Ramoof, a prosecutor in Karachi's ATC, asserted that data from electronic
surveillance of terrorist suspects was "essential in prosecution and curbing
the menace of terrorism." 83
E. Fair Trial Act 2013
The positive developments brought forth by the Act include security
agents and police referring their request to conduct surveillance to a leading
officer in their agency, who must then seek permission from the Interior
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See generally Fair Trial Act, supra note 6, at Preamble.
180. Qanun-E-Shahdat Order, supra note 157, at 69 ("In such cases as the Court may consider
appropriate, the Court may allow to be produced any evidence that may have become available because
of modem devices or techniques.").
181. Fair Trial Act, supra note 6, at Preamble.
182. Hussain, supra note 170.
183. Imtiaz, supra note 11.
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Ministry, and the Court.'" Further, the application to the Court by the
intelligence officer must be accompanied by:
[A] signed statement of authorized officer that the warrant shall
be used only and exclusively for preventing or lawfully
investigating a scheduled offense . . . and the same shall not be
misused in any manner, nor the approval of the warrant shall be
abused to interfere or intervene in the privacy of any person.1ss
If the judge finds there is reason to believe that the intelligence agent is
misusing the warrant, they can order direct departmental proceedings for
wrongful warrant applications by its officers. 8 6
When granting a warrant, the judge must ensure that "the issuance of
warrant shall not unduly interfere in the privacy of any person or
property."'8 The judge can refuse to grant a warrant if "he has reasons to
believe that the warrant is being procured with mala fide intention," or if
the warrant request is "based on insufficient evidence or has resulted in an
undue and inappropriate interference in the privacy of any person."'8 8 The
warrant can be issued for no longer than sixty days, however, the
intelligence agent can request a reissuance of another six months if they can
show good cause.'89 Once the intelligence agent has been granted the
warrant, they are permitted to contact any service provider of internet or
telephone services, who must permit the agent to tap certain lines.190 If the
service provider does not comply, they can be charged up to ten million
rupees in fines, but if they do comply, they are still immune from any form
of criminal prosecution.' 9 ' If incriminating information is found through
the surveillance, the Fair Trial Act allows for the admission of electronic
184. Maham Javaid, Tapping into Evidence, HERALD (Mar. 5, 2013), available at
http://herald.dawn.com/2013/03/05/tapping-into-evidence.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2014)
The first is that the personnel of that agency must first notify an officer of grade
20 or above in their own department of their suspicions regarding a possible terror
suspect. If the authorizing officer deems the preliminary evidence strong enough
to warrant interception, he will forward a written application to the interior
minister. Once the interior minister's permission has been obtained, the officer
may apply to a High Court judge for a warrant.
185. Fair Trial Act, supra note 6, at Ch.2(8)(c)(i).
186. Id. at Ch.3(15).
187. Id. at Ch.3(10)(2)(b).
188. Id. at Ch.3(11)(e).
189. Id. at Ch.3(14).
190. Fair Trial Act, supra note 6, at Ch.4(17)(1).
191. Id. at Ch.4(20).
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data, audio, and video collected as proper evidence in the criminal case
against the accused.192
Along with formalizing and institutionalizing the use of electronic
surveillance for terrorism cases, the Fair Trial Act also empowers the police
to collect said information on their own.19 3 Previously, the police would
have had to request intelligence agencies like the ISI for electronic
surveillance information,19 4 but the current Act allows them to conduct
electronic monitoring on their own.' 95 Unlike their counterparts in the
United States, where police have traditionally conducted domestic
surveillance at the exclusion of agencies like the CIA, Pakistan's police
have lacked experience in electronic surveillance and evidence collection,
as is demonstrated by their intelligence agents inability to provide
admissible evidence to the courts for prosecution.' 96 While the Fair Trail
Act allows intelligence agencies to monitor citizens inside and outside the
nation,19 7 which is something the U.S. FISA courts tried to prohibit by
erecting the wall between criminal investigation and intelligence gathering,
the law empowers police to properly investigate terrorism with evidence
that can be admissible to the Court.' 98
F. Critiques of Fair Trial Act
While the law aims "to prevent the law enforcement and intelligence
agencies from using their powers arbitrarily . . . to regulate the said powers
and provide for their permissible and fair uses in accordance with law and
under proper executive and judicial oversight,"' 99 critics argue that several
provisions of the bill are unacceptable. First, under an early version of the
bill, a high-ranking intelligence officer could bypass a judge and permit
surveillance under complete secrecy for up to seven days in certain
192. See id. at Ch.5(23).
193. See Imtiaz, supra note 11.
194. Id. at 1.
195. Fair Trial Act, supra note 6, at Ch.1(3)(a) (applicant means "any law enforcement agency
including the Police, Federial Investigation Agency, Anti Narcotis Task Force, Pakistan Customs,
Pakistan Maritime Security Agency, Fronties Constabulary").
196. See id. at Ch.5(23).
197. Id. at Preamble (2)(1)(c) ("The provisions of this Act shall apply to all citizens of Pakistan
within or outside Pakistan .... It shall also apply to all transactions or communications originated or
concluding within Pakistan or originated or concluded outside Pakistan by any person.").
198. Id. at Ch. 3(22)(1).
199. Fair Trial Act, supra note 6, at Preamble.
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circumstances. 2 00 The provision was reserved for the "ticking time bomb"
situations where security agents would need to act immediately, however,
Barrister Khan argued that the interim warrant would be too easy to
misuse.20 1 Critiques of this provision were voiced by the political
opposition parties during the Senate's debate, and it was eventually
removed from the final text of the law.202 However, the potential inclusion
of this provision demonstrates the willingness of the ruling administration
to expand surveillance powers, in the process of setting rules for them.
Others have complained about the lax standard to be applied by the
judges in granting such warrants. In the warrant request, the Act only
requires the government to:
[H]ave reasons to believe that the person is likely to be associated
with or is beginning to get associated with any prohibited act or
is in the process of beginning to plan such an act or is indulging
in such conduct or activity that arises suspicion that he is likely to
plan or attempt to commit offense.203
This standard is far different than the FISA court's standard of "probable
cause" in the United States, as there merely needs to be a reasonable
suspicion on behalf of the agent and judge in Pakistan. 204 Further, there are
issues with the balance of privacy rights when the law permits surveillance
of those "likely to be associated with or beginning to get associated with,"
which is more expansive than being able to monitor only those who are
planning or committing crimes.205 Moreover, the list of crimes covered by
the Act includes many non-terrorism related offenses such as the State
Secrets Act.206 Some have complained this opens the door for the Army to
200. Fair Trial Act Bill of 2012, Ch.3(14), available at
http://www.nagov.net/uploads/documents/1349757295_711.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (bill as
introduced before Majlis-e-Shoora).
201. Javaid, supra note 184.
202. Raja Asghar, 'Fair Trial Bill' Passed in Big Compromise, DAWN, (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://www.dawn.com/news/772798/fair-trial-bill-passed-in-big-compromise (last visited Nov. 14,
2014).
203. Fair Trial Act, supra note 6, at Ch.2(5).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See id. at Ch.9, Schedule 1; see also Official Secrets Act, No. 19 of 1923 (PAK.).
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"endanger the fundamental rights of citizens,"207 by targeting activists and
dissidents.2 08
The Act also does away with many of the requirements for police
conducting physical searches that exist in the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
While during a physical search, there are two witnesses required to be
present in order to hold the police accountable, the Fair Trial Act allows for
far greater secrecy and non-accountability.20 9 Under Article 5.27, any
official performing any function under this act shall ensure complete
secrecy of the process and shall refrain from any disclosures that may
compromise the future capabilities of intelligence gathering. 210 Therefore,
in most situations the intelligence agent will only be required to disclose the
requested surveillance with the Interior Ministry and the warrant-reviewing
judge, limiting review of such surveillance.21 1
V. CONCLUSION AND ALTERNATIVES
A. Conclusion
The continued proliferation of terrorism and the growing trend of
governments overriding their citizens' protections for a fair trial and
privacy require new methods that both ensure a nation's safety and uphold
its humanitarian, constitutional, and international values. The General
Assembly of United Nations affirmed that,
[R]espect for human rights and the rule of law [is] the
fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism .... [Member
States] reaffirm[ed] that the promotion and protection of human
rights for all and respect for the rule of law are essential to all
components of the Strategy, and recognized that effective
counterterrorism measures and the protection of human rights are
not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually
reinforcing.212
207. Javaid, supra note 184 (quoting Sana Saleem, "[tihe law should only be restricted to terror
suspects," she says, otherwise, "the phone tapping and electronic eavesdropping mandated by law could
endanger the fundamental rights of all citizens.").
208. See id.; see also Fair Trial Act, supra note 6.
209. See generally Fair Trial Act, supra note 6..
210. Fair Trial Act, supra note 6, at Ch.5(23).
211. Id. at Ch.2(6).
212. G.A. Res. 60/288, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288, at 9 (Sept. 20, 2006).
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Therefore, it is incumbent upon nations to deal with terrorism in a
similar manner as other long running domestic criminal problems. Nations
like the United States and Pakistan must try to strike the fine balance
between security and freedom. In the alternative, if one is to concede the
invocations of the emergency rule that legitimize wholesale abrogation of
fundamental civil rights under certain circumstances, three phenomena will
occur concurrently, as they have been in the United States and Pakistan
recently. The executive branch will expand categorizations of "national
security" to be able to exclusively, secretively, and unilaterally control
more parts of the government, thereby disturbing the system of checks and
balances. The judicial branch will continue to both compromise its own
power by deferring to the executive branch, and lose institutional power
through the passage of anti-judiciary and anti-terrorism legislation like the
PATRIOT Act. Lastly, if current trend concerning the suspension of
constitutional protections for terrorism continues, it will challenge the
jurisprudence developed for over 200 years concerning the right of citizens
to privacy, dignity, information, and a fair trial.
These phenomena have led to a breakdown of limitations for
government officials wishing to monitor their citizens. In the United States,
the warrant requirement was required for electronic surveillance but this
prerequisite approval from a judge vanished for certain citizens with the
passage of laws like the PATRIOT Act and the PAA. Additionally, anti-
terrorism legislation has led to an increased scope of monitoring by
intelligence gathering institutions such as the CIA, even though the Church
Committee found that these institutions could not be entrusted with the
power to intrude on citizens' right to privacy. In Pakistan, while there have
been warrant requirements for physical searches, there was an absence of
legislation concerning modern electronic surveillance. The Fair Trial Act
attempts to pull surveillance from the shadows into the rule of law by
requiring intelligence officials and police to seek judicial approval before
wiretapping of any suspect. However, critics argue that the Act goes too far
in granting intelligence agencies, known for their political manipulation and
brutal activities, the right to impede the right to privacy for invalid reasons.
Critics of the criminal enforcement model argue that civilian courts are
ineffective at battling terrorism because they have standards of proof that
cannot be met due to the nature of terrorism. However, the illegal practices
of intelligence agencies in Pakistan and the United States are a primary
cause for the inability of courts to prosecute individuals. These suspects
might in fact be terrorists, but have been subject to illegal treatment by the
government, requiring most of the evidence collected against them to be set
aside by the Court in accordance with constitutional protections. Therefore,
when considering modern methods of electronic surveillance, one must
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keep in the mind the end goal of prosecuting suspects with admissible and
legally obtained evidence.
B. Recommendations
The general recommendation to both the United States and Pakistan
regarding surveillance laws is to reevaluate the way in which the
government and its intelligence agencies interpret the balance between
security and privacy. There should be an increased reliance on the
historical protections afforded to citizens through physical searches by
analogizing them to modern surveillance practices. Both Pakistan and the
United States have developed laws and common law practices that require
the state to respect the privacy of its citizens by limiting the scope of its
searches, which should be respected by intelligence agencies in battling
terrorism. Along with respecting the rights of the citizen, the investigating
authorities must also respect the right of the judicial branch to be involved
throughout the surveillance process in order to hold the authorities
accountable for their duty to uphold the security-privacy balance. The
warrant requirement is an embodiment of this right, and should continue to
be applied for terrorism cases in both Pakistan, through the Fair Trial Act,
and the United States, through the FISA courts.
For the United States, the executive branch and FISA courts
themselves should reconsider easing the burden of proof for investigating
authorities dealing with terrorism, and should maintain the "probable
cause" standard or something near it in order to allow the government to
investigate properly without intruding on the rights of citizens. In Pakistan,
the Fair Trial Act should either be amended or interpreted by the Supreme
Court as requiring proof of probable cause for warrant requesting agencies,
rather than the "reasonable suspicion" standard currently in place.
The wall between criminal investigation and intelligence gathering
should be reconstructed in order to limit the scope of surveillance that
international intelligence agencies can engage in domestically. For the
United States, there needs to be a restructuring of the surveillance process
to prohibit the CIA from being able to either receive warrants from the
FISA courts to monitor citizens, or worse, to do so without a warrant. The
FBI and local police authorities should continue to share information and
conduct surveillance in pursuit of criminal prosecutions. In Pakistan, the
Fair Trial Act should be reexamined to place a greater emphasis on the
power of local police in investigating terrorist plots through electronic
surveillance, shifting this power out of the hands of the nation's intelligence
agencies like the ISI.
Further, while the target of warrant should likely not be informed of
the government's monitoring as is required in physical searches, there must
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be something that holds intelligence agencies and police accountable for
their actions. These officials often rely on governmental immunity to avoid
punishment for carrying out abuses of the surveillance process. Therefore,
a personal enforcement mechanism is the only way to hold these
individuals accountable. Both countries should consider allowing the same
judicial body that grants warrants the power to hold intelligence officers in
contempt of court if they are attempting to abuse the warrant process, either
by bringing frivolous requests or failing to abide by the limitations required
by the warrant.
Lastly, maintaining a proper balance between constitutional rights and
the duty of the state to investigate and prosecute terrorism will require a
vigilant judicial body and a more respectful executive branch. Judges have
been silenced in many ways in the age of terrorism either fearing for their
personal safety as in Pakistan, or the risk of allowing another terrorist attack
to occur due to inadequacies in the judicial process, as in the United States.
However, just as in all other criminal cases, the job of the judiciary is to
hold the state accountable for when it wishes to invade the privacy or
freedom guaranteed to its citizens. Holding the state accountable for its
duties does not equate to co-opting or assisting terrorism, but rather, is an
ideological assault against the lawless nature of terrorist methodologies. As
guardians of the Constitution, the judicial branch must be reinvigorated
regarding issues of privacy and modem surveillance, rather than conceding
to fear-mongering and anti-judicial principles advocated by anti-terrorism
hawks.
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